HT Dr. Zin - Regime Change Iran
Dr. Zin has yet to post his digest for Saturday, Jan 28, 2006. It has some excellent analysis pieces on the developing situation in Iran. Signs of civil and ethnic urnest are rising.
If you don't read anything, do read this excerpt by Kagan in the Washington Post,
It's the Regime, Stupid :
Communicate directly to Iran's very westernized population, through radio, the Internet and other media; organize international support for unions and human rights and other civic groups, as well as religious groups that oppose the regime; provide covert support to those willing to use it; and impose sanctions, not so much to stop the nuclear program -- since they probably won't -- but to squeeze the business elite that supports the regime
Fire in Tehran Metro Station
SMCCDI (Information Service):
Fire forced the closure of the Navab Metro Station in the Iranian Capital. The incident which is believed to be an act of arson took place today and on the same day that many of Tehran's Collective Bus drivers observed a protest action.
Official sources have attributed the fire to a short circuit but curiously the same motif was used in order to justify the burning of a collective bus, happened the day before, in southern Tehran.
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It's the Regime, Stupid
Robert Kagan, The Washington Post:
If an air and missile strike could destroy Iran's nuclear weapons program, it might seem the best of many bad options. But the likely costs outweigh the benefits.
Is the intelligence on Iran so much better than it was on Iraq? The Clinton administration launched Operation Desert Fox against Iraq in 1998 to degrade its weapons programs, and even today we don't know what it achieved. As President Clinton later put it, "We might have gotten it all; we might have gotten half of it; we might have gotten none of it. But we didn't know."
Would Desert Fox II in Iran, even on a larger scale, produce a very different result? The Pentagon can hit facilities it can see with relative confidence. But much of Iran's program is underground, and some of it we don't know about. Even if a strike set back Iran's plans, we would not know by how much. For all the price we would pay, we wouldn't even know what we'd achieved.
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Then there is the prospect of Iranian retaliation: terrorist attacks, military activity in Iraq, attempts to close off the Persian Gulf shipping lanes and disrupt oil supplies. Unless we were prepared to escalate, ultimately to the point of taking down the regime, we could end up in worse shape than when we began.
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We need to reorient our strategy. Our justifiable fixation on preventing Iran from getting the bomb has somehow kept us from pursuing a more fundamental and more essential goal: political change in Iran. We need to start supporting liberal and democratic change for an Iranian population that we know seeks both.
No one wants to see Iran get a bomb, but it does matter who is in power. We don't worry that France or Great Britain has nuclear weapons. We tolerate India's and Israel's arsenals largely because we have some faith that their democratic governments will not use them. Were Iran ruled by even an imperfect democratic government, we would be much less concerned about its weaponry.
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The Bush administration, despite its doctrine of democratization, has not yet tried to apply it in the one place where ideals and strategic interest most clearly intersect. It has done little to push for political change or to exploit the evident weaknesses in the mullahs' regime.
The steps are obvious: Communicate directly to Iran's very westernized population, through radio, the Internet and other media; organize international support for unions and human rights and other civic groups, as well as religious groups that oppose the regime; provide covert support to those willing to use it; and impose sanctions, not so much to stop the nuclear program -- since they probably won't -- but to squeeze the business elite that supports the regime
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Moscow's Mad Gamble
Mortimer B. Zuckerman, US News & World Report:
Russian President Vladimir Putin, in an interview several years ago, criticized America's decision to go to war against Iraq and told me, "The real threat is Iran." He was right. But Russia has become part of the problem, not the solution.
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Radical Islam - with Sovereignty
Jonathan Spyer, Ha'aretz:
Iran is radical Islam with sovereignty, and it seeks to become radical Islam with a nuclear capability. In its dealings with Israel, on the basis of ideology alone, it sponsors organizations whose main purpose is the murder of civilians. The West will need to decide if it feels happy about such a body possessing nuclear weapons.
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw last week hurried to dispel any sense of imminent crisis in the nuclear stand-off with Iran. "I don't think we should rush our fences here," Straw told an audience in London, before going on to suggest that Iran's concern to avoid seeing the issue of its nuclear program brought before the UN Security Council indicated the "strength of the authority of that body." Iranian defiance of international will on the question of its uranium enrichment program, and President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's open advocacy of the destruction of Israel and embrace of Holocaust denial, have caused widespread alarm and expressions of concern. Straw, however, confirms that basic European assumptions on Iran remain unchanged. Israel's experience with the Islamic Republic of Iran offers some clues as to the likely effectiveness of the European approach.
Iran's support for Palestinian organizations engaged in violence against Israel is of long standing. Palestinian Islamic Jihad has since its inception claimed inspiration from the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. Ramadan Shallah, the movement's leader, described his organization in May 2002 as "one of the many fruits on our leader Khomeini's tree." Israeli assessments consider the Iranians to be Islamic Jihad's near sole source of funding. The mullahs, as may be seen from last week's bombing in Tel Aviv, get a fair return for their outlay. In Islamic Jihad, Iran purchases for itself a fully deniable instrument of policy. The organization may be activated at will in order to keep the conflict on the boil, help scupper the calm that must precede a return to negotiation, and so on.
Iran's relations with Hamas are more complex. There ought to be a natural rivalry and indeed hostility between the Shiite mullahs and the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The evidence suggests that in the first years of Hamas' existence, mutual anathema did indeed pertain. In the 1990s, however, a close relationship developed. The basis of this, of course, was a shared strategic commitment to the destruction of Israel. In the shorter term, a common desire to stymie all attempts at a diplomatic resolution of the conflict brought the Shiite Islamists of Tehran and the Sunni radicals of Gaza together. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin led a Hamas delegation to Iran in April, 1998. The delegation met with officials from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's office, then minister of intelligence and security Ghorban Ali Dorrie Najafabadi and leaders of the Qods force - the special operations unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.
According to Arabic media sources, the result was the creation of a "strategic alliance," which saw the commencement of large financial transfers from Iran to Hamas. The funds were to come from the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and other subsidiary bodies. Precise figures regarding the level of support are hard to come by. One respected United States researcher estimated that Iranian funding of Hamas probably reaches between $20 million and $50 million annually.
What relevance should all this have on the Western understanding of Iran? For the world according to Jack Straw to work, Iran must be understood to be a country governed by rational, practical men who, faced with firm criticism from the UN Security Council, will adjust their plans accordingly. The evidence outlined above, however, suggests that Islamist Iran is not like that. The support given to Hamas and Islamic Jihad continued untroubled during the presidency of the "moderate" Mohammed Khatami, before the arrival of Ahmedinejad, and the rise of the Revolutionary Guards. With no conceivable geo-strategic gain for itself, the non-Arab Iran, situated geographically far from Israel's borders and surrounded by unfriendly countries, chose to pour money into organizations committed to the destruction of Israel. They did so because of an idea.
The Israeli experience thus suggests three things. The mullahs take their ideas seriously. They back them up with money and action. And the revolutionary ideas in question transcend their Shia origins, enabling Iran to sponsor a variety of radical Islamist groups, and to present itself as the key, sovereign force in radical Islam.
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Iran: Threat of Ethnic Dissent
Amir Taheri, Arab News:
Anxious to cultivate his populist image, Iran’s new President Ahmadinejad has promised to hold the monthly sessions of his Cabinet in provincial capitals rather than Tehran.
Now, however, it seems as if, for reasons of security, he may not be able to take his road show to all of Iran’s 30 provinces.
A session scheduled to take place in the province of Kurdistan last month had to be rescheduled at the last minute, supposedly because the relevant documents were not ready in time. And last week the president was forced to cancel another session, due to take place in Ahvaz, capital of the Khuzistan province, ostensibly for bad weather.
In both cases, however, factors other than bureaucratic delay and bad weather may have been at work.
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Ahmadinejad would be wrong to dismiss or minimize the threat of ethnic dissent in the Islamic Republic. Iran’s ethnic minorities, including the Kurds, the Arabs, the Turkmen and the Baluch, account for at least 12 percent of the population.
Located along the country’s long and porous borders these communities could be open to manipulation by anyone who wishes to weaken Iran or pay back in the same currency the Islamic Republic for its machinations in neighboring countries.
Political expediency, not to mention justice and human rights, demands that urgent attention be paid to the legitimate grievances of Iran’s ethnic minorities. It took Turkey some 30 years of war to understand that it cannot force its Kurdish minority to abandon their identity and become ersatz Turks. It has taken Iraq almost 80 years of tragic experiments to recognize the Kurds as a distinct people deserving full cultural and national rights. In the long run Iran’s unity could only be preserved in the context of pluralist diversity.
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Soft Power
James Harkin, The Guardian:
Speak softly, and carry a big carrot. For decades, even Europe's friends chuckled at this parody of its timid approach to foreign policy adventures. In its negotiations with Iran over its nuclear ambitions, however, Europe has been promoting the embrace of "soft power" as an exciting new tool for diplomacy.
Soft power is to the American military machine what the idea of the new man is to traditional masculinity. It is, according to the new European catechism, a more civilised way of doing things - one based on rational argument, proper procedure and bureaucratic haggling. In an only partly light-hearted article for the journal Foreign Policy in 2004, one analyst identified Europe as the world's first "soft" or "metrosexual" superpower
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Iran or Bust
Jeffrey Bell, The Weekly Standard:
The defining test of Bush's war presidency.
Events are covering the nuclear crisis with Iran into the central crisis of the Bush presidency. War presidents are graded not by circumstances they inherit, including those that lead to war. They are judged by how they react to those circumstances.
Franklin Roosevelt as a war president is defined not by the attack on Pearl Harbor, but by the radical war aim he laid out against Japan and Germany in the wake of Pearl Harbor--unconditional surrender--and by his relentless and successful pursuit of that war aim until the day he died.
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Read them All
[Hit this link and then scroll the thread for Jan 28, 2006]